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Abstract
The introduction of the Single Market resulted in a switch from destination to
origin-based taxation of cross-border transactions by individuals. The theory
of commodity tax competition predicts that this change should give rise to
excise tax competition and thus intensify strategic interaction in the setting of
excise taxes. In this paper, we provide an empirical test of this prediction using
a panel data set of 12 EU countries over the period 1987-2004. We find that for
all excise duties that we consider (still and sparkling wine, beer, ethyl alcohol,
and cigarettes), strategic interaction between countries significantly increased
after 1993, consistently with the theoretical prediction. Indeed, for all these
products except for cigarettes, there is no evidence of strategic interaction
prior to 1993, so our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the
single market caused tax competition. For beer and ethyl alcohol, there is
evidence that the minimum taxes, also introduced in 1993, have intensified
strategic interaction.
JEL Classification: H70,H71,H77.
Keywords: tax competition, excise taxes, cross-border shopping.
* We would like to thank Paul Elhorst for helpful comments, and we are grateful to
the Office of Taxation and Customs of the European Commission for useful advices.
1
1 Introduction
The Single European Act, which came into force in July 1987, initiated a vast leg-
islative programme involving the adoption of hundreds of directives and regulations,
which gradually established the single market amongst EU member states over a pe-
riod up to the end of 1992. Two of most important provisions of the single market
were, first, to allow individuals to import relatively large quantities of goods pur-
chased abroad, which had previously been subject to the importing country’s rate
of tax; and second, the abolition of physical border controls, which were replaced
by random spot checks.
Before 1 January 1993, all imports to EU countries (either from EU countries or
from outside EU) were subject to a duty-free regime. That is, a small quantity of the
product could be bought at duty-free shops in airports, on boats, etc. without any
tax payable, and then brought into the country of residence of the purchaser. Any
excess imports were taxed by destination country (in practice, both duties and VAT
are imposed). It is important to note that duty-free allowances are quite small1.
On 1 January 1993, all imports to EU countries from other EU countries were
subject to no restrictions, except (i) that tax must have been paid in the country of
purchase of the good; and (ii) that good are not for resale. Condition (ii) is enforced
by generous upper limits, plus random customs checks at borders. For example,
according to the UK Customs and Excise,, ”if you bring back large quantities of
alcohol or tobacco, a Customs Officer is more likely to ask about the purposes for
which you hold the goods. This will most likely be the case if you appear at the
airport with more than: 3200 cigarettes, 400 cigarillos, 200 cigars, 3kg of smoking
tobacco, 110 litres of beer, 10 litres of spirits, 90 litres of wine, 20 litres of fortified
wine i.e.: port or sherry”. The above allowance is more than enough for the annual
consumption of the average two-adult household, and depending on the item, 15-40
times the UK duty-free allowance. Moreover, imports in excess of these levels do
not automatically trigger fines or prosecution: the levels are indicative only, and the
onus is on Customs officials to prove smuggling.
Obviously, these changes in the rules creates incentive both for legitimate tax-
induced cross-border shopping and for smuggling. There is evidence that both these
activities are occurring on a large scale at some borders. For example, the rates
of excise duty on alcoholic drinks and tobacco products in the UK are significantly
higher than those in most other EU Member States, especially France. In 1998,
the loss of UK tax revenue lost from legal cross border shopping was estimated
to be £375 million : £55m from beer, £180m from wine, £50m from spirits, and
£85m from tobacco products2. In 2003/04 in the UK, 10.5 billion cigarettes were
successfully smuggled and the further 6.5 billion cross-border shopped implying a
loss of £3.1 billion of tax revenue. (CMO Annual Report (2004)).
What is less clear is whether these changes, and the subsequent excise revenue
1For example, in the UK, the allowances were: 200 cigarettes, or 100 cigarillos, or 50 cigars, or
250 grams of tobacco, 2 litres of still table wine, 1 litre of spirits or strong liqueurs over 22% of
volume, or 2 litres of fortified wine, sparkling wine or other liqueurs.
2House of Commons Debate 26 November 1999 cc 254-5W.
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losses in high-tax countries, have caused tax competition between EU member states
to occur or intensify. Certainly, the theory (Kanbur and Keen 1993, Lockwood 1993,
Ohsawa 1999, Nielsen 2001)) suggest that this should happen. Technically, the Single
Market resulted in a switch from destination to origin-based taxation of cross-border
transactions by individuals. These models predict that tax competition only occurs
with origin-based taxation. So, the models predict, unambiguously and generally,
that we should observe competition in excise taxes between EU countries only after
1993.
Of course, strategic interaction can occur for other reasons e.g. yardstick compe-
tition, or common intellectual trends. So, the observable implication of the theory is
that strategic interaction between EU countries in the setting of excise taxes should
intensify after 1993. How much it intensifies depends on the scale of cross-border
shopping and potential revenue losses from high taxes: as the above discussion indi-
cates, these might be quite large. The key idea of the paper is that completion of the
single market can be interpreted as a kind of ”natural experiment” that allows us
to separate the effects of tax competition from other forms of strategic interaction.
This paper represents the first attempt, to our knowledge, to directly test this
observable prediction. We employ a balanced panel data set of 12 EU countries over
the period 1987-2004 and excise taxes on five commodities; still wine, sparking wine,
beer, products made ethyl alcohol i.e. spirits, and cigarettes. The excise tax data
were taken from the European Commission’s Excise Duty Tables and Inventory of
Taxes. Using this data set, we estimate an empirical model where the excise tax in
a given country depends linearly on the weighted average of other countries’ taxes,
and a set of control variables. The equation is estimated separately on subsamples
before and after 1993.
First, we find robust evidence that the coefficient estimates differ on the two sub-
samples. Specifically, looking across all five taxes, and a variety of different weighting
matrices suggested by the theory, the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients can
be rejected in every single case. Second, again looking across all five taxes, and a
variety of different weighting matrices (i) coefficient measuring strategic interaction
is always significantly positive post-1993; (ii) depending on the weighting matrix,
this coefficient is often not significant before 1993, indicating an absence of strate-
gic interaction; and (iii) whenever both are significant, the post-1993 coefficient is
higher.
So, the evidence certainly supports the hypothesis that strategic interaction in-
tensified after 1993. Moreover, if we focus on our ”baseline” weighting matrix i.e.
the maintained hypothesis that countries only interact with their geographical neigh-
bors, which is what is suggested by the theory, then the strategic coefficient is sig-
nificant before 1993 only for cigarettes. Thus one could go furthermore and say that
for the other four products, there is evidence, consistently with the theory, that the
single market caused tax competition.
We also investigate the impact of minimum tax rates, also introduced in 1993,
on strategic interaction. Unfortunately, as explained in Section 5.1, the theory does
not have any robust predictions about how a minimum tax will affect tax reaction
functions. Also, because we split the sample in 1993, we can only consider minimum
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taxes that change - in real terms - after 1993. Only two such minima meet this
criterion, the minimum taxes on beer and ethyl alcohol3. An increase in both of these
minima have a significantly positive effect on the amount of strategic interaction.
Related literature is as follows. First, there is a small empirical literature on
spatial interactions in excise taxes in the US (e.g. Nelson (2002), Rork (2003),
Lockwood at al. (2005)). But in the US, there has been no ”natural experiment”
similar to the completion of the single market in the EU in recent times. Within
the US, importation of commodities e.g. cigarettes subject to excises by individuals
for private consumption is essentially unrestricted4, meaning that the origin regime
is firmly in place for these kinds of transactions.
There are also a couple of cross-country empirical studies of strategic interaction
in commodity taxes (Egger et al. (2005), Evers et. al. (2004)). Egger et al. (2005)
test some of the predictions of Ohsawa’s theoretical model of commodity tax com-
petition on commodity tax data for a panel of 22 OECD countries. But, unlike our
study, they use an aggregate indicator of commodity taxation taken from national
accounts data, which, relative to our paper, obviously has the disadvantage that it
does not measure very precisely the setting of individual tax instruments by govern-
ments. The paper by Evers et. al. (2004), in contrast, studies strategic interaction
in the setting of diesel excises in EU countries, plus Norway and Switzerland, and
so is closest to our paper. But, almost by definition, the treatment of imports of
fuel in the tank of a vehicle must be on an origin basis5, and so completion of the
single market has no predicted effect on the setting of this excise, except possibly
through the introduction of a minimum EU excise; the latter effect is the focus of
Evers et. al. (2004).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain our econo-
metric method and estimation procedure. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4
the results and Section 5 some robustness checks. Section 6 provides concluding
comments.
2 The Econometric Model
In the theoretical model first presented by Kanbur and Keen(1993), and developed
by Ohsawa(1999), Nielsen (2001) amongst others, origin-based commodity taxation
generates positively sloped reaction functions i.e. that in country i, the excise tax,
ti, is an increasing, piecewise linear, function of the tax rate in the other countries,
tj , j 6= i. Moreover, under realistic assumptions
6, the response of ti to tj will
3The minimum tax on wine (still or sparkling) is zero, and on cigarettes, the minimum is
expressed as a percentage of the retail price, which has not changed since its introduction.
4The borderline of legality in the case of cigarettes is provided by the Contraband Cigarette
Act of 1978, which prohibits single shipments, sale or purchase of more than 60,000 cigarettes not
bearing the tax stamp of the state in which they are found.
5That is, even with border controls, customs officials have no way of knowing where the fuel in
the tank of a vehicle has been bought.
6That is, that is, that prices are such that consumers do not wish to drive though a third
country to buy in a low-tax country.
4
be non-zero only if i and j are contiguous i.e. share a common border. Finally,
this response will depend on the length of the border between i and j and also on
the population sizes in the two countries (Ohsawa 1999), Devereux, Lockwood and
Redoano(2005)).
Our empirical specification is therefore the following:
tis = fi +
∑
j 6=i
βijtjs + δ
′Zis + ǫis (1)
where i = 1, ..n denotes a country, and s = 1, ...S a time-period, fi a country fixed
effect, Zis a k × 1 vector of relevant characteristics of country i at time s, and δ a
k× 1 vector of coefficients. However, this cannot be estimated as it stands, as there
are too many parameters βij to be estimated. The usual approach is to modify (1)
as:
tis = fi + φ
∑
j 6=i
ωijtjs + δ
′Zis + ǫis (2)
where the ωij are exogenously chosen weights that aggregate the tax rates in other
countries into a single variable, which has coefficient φ. The ωij are usually normal-
ized so that
∑
j 6=i ωij = 1. This is a widely used procedure and there is considerable
discussion of the appropriate weights in the literature e.g. Brueckner(2003).
Our key theoretical hypothesis is that φ changes with the regime, being higher
when the Single Market regime is in place. In fact, if only tax competition is
present, and no other form of strategic interaction, we expect φ = 0 before 1993.
We test for this dependence by estimating (2) on two sub-samples. Initially, these
subsamples are 1987-1992, and 1993-2004. Let the estimates of φ on the earlier and
later subsample be φ1, φ2 respectively. So, our basic hypothesis is that φ2 > φ1. Note
also that as the fixed effects are estimated separately on the two subsamples, we also
effectively allow the intercept of the reaction functions (2) to shift after 1993.
The system (2) is known as a spatial autoregressive model (SAR). OLS estimation
of a SAR model is inappropriate, because the right-hand side variables tjs, j 6= i are
endogenous. We estimate this system by instrumental variables. At the first stage,
the endogenous variable
∑
j 6=i ωijtjs is instrumented by the weighted averages of the
controls i.e.
∑
j 6=i ωijz
c
js, for control c = 1, ..k. So, our maintained hypothesis is that
in country, the controls are exogenous to the setting of excise taxes on tobacco and
alcohol products; given our list of controls in Table 2 below, this seems reasonable.
Finally, we turn to the specification of the weighting matrix. Following the the-
oretical literature, and several empirical studies, our baseline weighting matrix uses
contiguity weights. These weights capture the idea that tax bases are mobile only
between geographically neighbouring countries. Specifically, we define contiguity
weights as:
ωij =
{
1
ni
if j ∈ Ni
0 if j /∈ Ni
(3)
where Ni is the set of states that border state i, and ni = #Ni. This assigns equal
weight to all countries on the border of country i, and weight zero to the other
countries. The matrix is normalized to have rows summing to one.
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One problem in implementing (3) is that it is difficult to define ”neighbors”
when a country is an island, or part of an island, or has no direct EU neighbors.
These problems arise for three of the eight countries in our data-set; UK, Ireland,
or Greece. A strict imposition of contiguity weights for the UK, for example, would
give only Ireland as the neighbor for the UK, and vice versa. This is inaccurate,
because it does not account for the considerable tax-induced cross-border shopping
between the UK and France. Our solution was to say that if i is an island, a
positive contiguity weight was given to country j when j could be directly reached
from country i by crossing only over water i.e. without passing through a third
country. But obviously, this is a rather arbitrary extension of the idea of contiguity.
A modification of contiguity weights often considered in the literature are dis-
tance weights. We use the longitude and latitude coordinates of the capitals of each
country, and applying a method called Delauney triangulation, we generates two
types of spatial weight matrix7. In practice, neighboring countries are given higher
or lower weights according to the distance between their capitals.
Finally, following Case, Hines and Rosen (1992) we adopt a robustness check.
Specifically, we want to test whether any weighting matrix will generate positive
strategic interaction between countries; if not, i.e. only contiguity-type weighting
matrices work, this is more evidence that the strategic interaction we observe is
no due to something inherent in the econometric tax competition. Following Case,
Hines and Rosen (1992), we construct a weighting matrix based on a ”nonsense”
procedure; ωij = 1 only if the name of country j comes after country i in the
alphabet.
3 Data
We construct a balanced panel of data from 12 EU countries over 17 years, 1987 and
1989-2004 inclusive8. We consider only the countries which were members of the EU
in 1987, excluding those that joined the EU later on. The final sample size has 204
observations. Data on excises are based on the Excise Duty Table issued by the
European Commission9, cross-checked against the available issues of the Inventory
of Taxes (only available for 1994, 1999, 2002). In the case of a discrepancy, which
were not many, we took the data from the Inventory of Taxes as being authoritative,
as this data is directly supplied by the member countries.
We study five kinds of products; still wine, sparkling wine, beer10, cigarettes,
7In practice, the Delauney algorithm uses the longitude and latitude coordinates to generate in
the plane a set of triangles. Two countries are contiguous if they have common vertex. Kelley Pace
has written the code (FDELW2.m) to convert Delauney algorithm results into a contiguity matrix.
The code is included in his Spatial Statistics toolbox 2.0 for Matlab, which can be downloaded
from www.spatial-statistics.com.
8Data are not available for the year 1988, so there are 204 observations.
9In the Appendix we discuss all the problems we had in collecting the data.
10In the case of beer, there were two kinds of physical unit used in the Excise Duty Tables:
degree Plato, and degree of alcohol by volume. According to Directive 92/84/EEC it has been
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and ethyl alcohol, the last being effectively an excise tax on spirits, such as whiskey,
brandy, etc. All of these products, except for cigarettes, are only subject to a specific
or unit excise tax i.e. levied per unit of physical quantity. Where there are several
rates of tax e.g. standard and reduced rates, we use only the standard rates.
In the case of cigarettes, all countries also levy an ad valorem excise tax. More-
over, depending on the country, either the specific or ad valorem component of the
tax can be the more important one and so we cannot safely ignore either. On the
other hand, we do not have data separately on the retail price of cigarettes, so we
are constrained by data in the Excise Duty Tables. In the case of cigarettes the
Excise Duty Tables also report the total tax (specific, ad valorem, and VAT) as
a percentage of the retail price, and that is our baseline indicator of the tax on
cigarettes.
In Figures 1-5, we report for each of the five goods the time series plot of the tax
rates in nominal national currency. Detailed comments commodity-by-commodity
are given in the section below on the regression results. But, some general features
can be identified. First, as might be expected, countries generally adjust their nom-
inal taxes upwards in nominal terms, in order to respond to general price inflation.
Second, there are some exceptions, associated with the start of the single market in
1993. For example, both Denmark and Luxembourg cut their tax on wine (still and
sparkling) in by large amounts in 1992, in the case of Luxembourg to zero. Again,
Denmark cut its tax on beer, and Germany and Luxembourg raised their tax on
beer, both by large amounts, in 1992.
When we run the regressions, we make two changes to the dependent variable
First, we adjust for inflation by dividing through by the RPI for the relevant country,
because rational governments will be concerned with the real, rather than nominal,
value of the taxes they set. Perhaps for this reason, we did not find any evidence
of strategic interaction when we used nominal taxes. Second, we find that our re-
gressions work a little better when the dependent variable is converted to Euro11,
possibly because countries are comparing their own taxes to others in different na-
tional currencies, and can only do so in a common currency.
Finally, in estimating the determinants of the taxes, we need to control for other
factors. We use a parsimonious set of controls that can be found in most of the
existing empirical literature. These include: economic variables (GDP per capita in
local currency unit and government final consumption expenditure as a percentage
of GDP) and a demographic variable (total population in millions of inhabitants).
All of these variables are taken from World Bank WDI (2004). We add two polit-
ical dummy variables for the ideological orientation of governments. We used the
Schmidt Index12, included in the Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2004 (Armi-
accepted that a tax of 0.748 euro Plato is equal to a tax of 1.87 euro alcohol by volume, and we
applied this conversion factor.
11Before 1999, we converted national currencies to ECU using the exchange rates provided in
the Excise Duty Tables.
12This is an index created by Schmidt (1996) and which gives different weights according to
the cabinet composition. Schmidt-Index: (1) hegemony of right-wing parties (govleft = 0), (2)
dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties (govleft < 33.3), (3) stand-off between left and right
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geon et al., 2006), to define a dummy for right-wing cabinets, a dummy for stand-off
between left and right cabinets, and a dummy for left-wing cabinets. The second
dummy is used as reference category in the estimation. The descriptive statistics
for the controls are also given in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary Statistics - Control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
poptota 292.13 268.52 3.72 825.41
gdppcb 365.40 561.59 73.95 2484.32
govconsc 19.86 3.30 13.74 26.76
govrightd 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
govlefte 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
atotal population (in millions)
bGDP per capita local currency unit
cgovernment final cons. expend. (% of GDP)
d e proportion of cabinets.
4 Results
The results are given by commodity in Tables 4-6. All have the same format i.e.
for each of the four weighting matrices, estimates of equation (2) over the period
1987-92, and 1993-2004 are given separately.
The following diagnostic statistics are reported. First, Pagan and Hall’s (1983)
test is a test of heteroskedasticity for instrumental variables (IV) estimation. This
statistic is distributed as chi-squared under the null of no heteroskedasticity, and
under the maintained hypothesis that the error of the regression is normally dis-
tributed. When we find heteroskedasticity we report the corrected standard errors
using a robust variance estimator. Second, the F test in the first stage of the esti-
mation tests the null hypothesis of whether the instruments are not correlated with
the endogenous variable. A rejection means that there is such a correlation. Third,
the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio tests whether the equation is
identified13. The statistic provides a measure of instrument relevance, and rejection
of the null indicates that the model is identified. Fourth, the Hansen-Sargan test
is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the in-
struments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the
(33.3 < govleft < 66.6), (4 ) dominance of social-democratic and other left parties (govleft > 66.6),
(5) hegemony of socialdemocratic and other left parties (govleft = 100).
13The null hypothesis of the test is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K-
1, where K=number of regressors, i.e, that the equation is underidentified. Under the null of
underidentification, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(L-K+1),
where L=number of instruments (included+excluded).
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null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying
restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments.
4.1 Still Wine
Looking at Figure 1, six countries out of twelve have zero tax rates on wine still, LU
reduced the excise to zero in 1993. Therefore, it is not easy to analyze a situation
of tax competition. The UK only increased slowly the rate over the 17 year-period,
some of the others (BE, IE, NL, FR) increased it just once or twice after 1992 and
some countries (DK, LU) decreased the rate in 1993 and keeping it constant after.
The first two columns of Table 2 show the equation using a contiguity weight
matrix. The equation after 1993 performs much better, note first the Chow test is
rejected and there is a structural break after 1993. The controls are joint signifi-
cant and the standard errors correct for heteroskedasticity according to the Pagan
test. We reject the F test of no correlation between instrument and endogenous
variables. The equation passes both tests on IV validity, i.e. Anderson and Hansen
tests. Turning on the spatial lagged coefficient: WTAX is increasing, positive and
significant after 1993, before it is negative and insignificant. Also, note that as the
taxes are in levels, the interpretation of the coefficients is that after 1993, for exam-
ple, a 1 Euro increase in the specific tax on wine still in all other countries causes a
given country to raise its tax by about 0.4 Euros.
Looking across the other matrix specifications the same picture is confirmed. The
WTAX coefficient is always positive, highly significant and increasing after 1993.
A further confirmation is given by the estimation with Wrand, since the WTAX
coefficients are negative and insignificant. The difference between the results based
on distance weights on the one hand, and random weights on the other, gives us
some confidence that we are picking up some real effect.
4.2 Sparkling Wine
The tax rates of the excise on wine sparkling reproduce a similar pattern as for
wine still, that is there are some countries with a zero rate and others increasing
or reducing the rates after 1993 (see Figure 2). Looking at the second column of
Table 3 note that estimation of the equation after 1993 gives better results than the
equation before 1993. Again, the Chow test provides evidence of a structural break
after 1993. The controls are jointly significant. All the diagnostic tests pass, this
means validity of the instruments and identification of the model.
Using a contiguity matrix, the coefficient of WTAX after 1993 is positive and
significant, while before 1993 it is negative and insignificant. Across the other matrix
specifications we get the same results, further confirmed using Wrand where the
coefficient after 1993 is negative and not significant. In our baseline specification, a
1 Euro increase in duty by all other countries causes the home country to riase its
tax by about 1.2 Euros.
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4.3 Beer
Looking at Figure 3 we first notice that all countries have positive excise duties on
beer, and only PT and UK have a clear constant increasing trend. Some countries
(such as ES, DE, FR and LU) react to the market unification with strong increase
of the tax rates in 1993. Other countries (DK, IT, NL) have the opposite behavior
decreasing their tax rates.
The first two columns in Table 4 give estimates of equation (2) over the period
1987-92, and 1993-2004, for our baseline case of contiguity weights. First, note that
we can reject the null hypothesis that the two regressions are the same. Gener-
ally speaking, the second regression performs better than the first; the controls are
jointly significant. The F-test in the first stage shows absence of correlation between
the endogenous variable and the instruments. The rejection of the Anderson test
indicates that the model is identified, and finally the model passes the Hansen test
of over-identifying restrictions that means that the instruments used are valid.
Turning on the key coefficient of the variable WTAX, it is insignificant before
1993, and larger and significant after 1993, consistent with the main hypothesis of
this paper. In our baseline specification, a 1 Euro increase by all other countries
leads the home country to increase its tax by abour 0.3 Euros. Looking across the
different weighting matrices, we see that this picture is similar for Wdis1, Wdis2.
But now, the slope of the reaction function is much larger; indeed, implausibly large.
Finally, in the case of Wrand, we see that the spatial lag coefficient is only positive
before 1993, and negative, very small in absolute value, and insignificant afterwards.
4.4 Ethyl alcohol
In Figure 4 we notice an increasing tax rate trend in any country. After 1993, the
main reaction is to put up the rate, some countries (e.g. LU, FR, IT) show big
jumps. DK and DE reduce their rate after 2000, IE and NL instead increase it in
the same period.
Looking at the first two columns of Table 5 we notice first from the Chow test that
there is a structural break after 1993. Focusing on the second equation, the controls
are jointly significant and the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. The
F-test in the first stage says that the instruments are correlated with the WTAX
variable, and the Anderson test indicates that the model is identified. The Hansen
test is not rejected therefore the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from
the estimated equation.
The coefficient of WTAX after 1993 is significant at 10% and almost the double of
the coefficient before 1993, although the latter is not significant. Specifically, after
1993, our finding is that a 1 Euro increase by all other countries leads the home
country to increase its tax by about 0.68 Euros. A similar pattern is confirmed
with a uniform matrix, with Wdis1 and Wdis2 instead the coefficient of WTAX is
decreasing after 1993, however with Wdis2 the spatial lag coefficient before 1993 is
not significant. Again, when we use Wrand, we get a completely different picture,
in this case enormously high positive coefficients, with significance only before 1993.
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This again is evidence that real spatial interactions are being measured in the first
three regressions.
4.5 Cigarettes
Looking at Figure 5, we notice a generally across countries, increasing trends in the
tax rates from 1987 to 2004. In general, the increase is small but for Ireland and
the UK the excises have been more than doubled. The first two columns of Table 6
give the estimates using a contiguity matrix and we observe how the second equation
performs better. We notice first that there is a structural break after 1993. Moreover
the controls are jointly significant. Looking at the diagnostic tests, we reject the
F-test in the first stage at 5%, there is correlation between the instruments and
WTAX. We reject also the Anderson test, the model is identified. The equation
passes the Hansen test of OID restrictions that means that the instruments used are
valid.
Turning to the coefficients of the spatial lagged dependent variable WTAX, we
see that it is always positive, significant and in all specifications, it is increasing in
value after 1993. In our baseline specification, a 1 Euro increase in the specific tax
rate on cigarettes in all other countries causes a given country to raise its tax by
about 1.3 Euros. Looking across the other matrix specifications, the same picture
is confirmed. When using Wrand we have positive and significant coefficients, but
the model after 1993 is not valid since it does not pass the Hansen test on OID
restrictions.
4.5.1 Total Tax on Cigarettes
Looking at Figure 6 we notice that the total tax on cigarettes show the same trend as
the specific excise. For all countries there is increase in the tax after 1993, however
we observe a small decrease in the early years of 2000s. e.g DK, IE, PT and UK.
Other countries follow the opposite pattern instead, they further increase their tax
rate, e.g. DE, FR and IT. In Table 7 we report our estimations, and we first note that
there is always a structural break with all the weight matrices used. The diagnostic
tests confirm the validity of the instruments and the absence of heteroskedasticity.
The coefficient of WTAX is not increasing when we consider a contiguity matrix,
but it slightly decreases after 1993. When we use distance matrices we get results
consistent with the theory, in fact WTAX is always positive, highly significant and
increasing after 1993. With WRAND the coefficients of WTAX are negative and
not significant.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Minimum Tax Rates
So far in the analysis, we have ignored any possible effects of minimum tax rates.
Evers et. al.(2005), based on the theoretical literature, argue that such rates, if they
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affect the Nash equilibrium at all, will generally cause rates to rise. For example,
in Nielsen’s (2001) model, it is easily verified in the two-country case that if the
minimum tax is binding on the lower-tax country, it will not only raise the tax in
that country, but also in the other country, as the latter country is moved along its
upward-sloping tax reaction function. So, we should expect, other things equal, the
minimum tax to increase the intercepts of the reaction functions.
It is less clear how the minimum tax will affect the amount of strategic interac-
tion. Again, in the same simple two-country model of Nielsen, a minimum tax that
binds on the low-tax country (say country B) will make the country B’s tax locally
unresponsive to A’s tax. Evers et. al.(2005) allow for such effects by interacting
the minimum tax with the weighted average of other countries’ taxes. So, given
that minimum taxes did not come in force until 1993, one might estimate, over the
period 1993-2004, an augmented version of (4) i.e.
tis = fi + φ
∑
j 6=i
ωijtjs + δ
′Zis + θmt + γ
(
mt ×
∑
j 6=i
ωijtjs
)
+ ǫis (4)
where mt is the minimum tax at time t. We expect θ > 0 and possibly γ 6= 0. But
there are some complications.
First, for wine (still and sparkling) the minimum tax rate is zero, so (4) cannot
be estimated for these products. Second, for cigarettes, the minimum tax rate
(measured as a percentage of the retail price) has been unchanged since 1993, at
57%. So, as the minimum tax rate mt is not time-varying in this case, θ, γ cannot
be identified from regression (4) just over the period 1993-2004.
For beer the minimum tax rate has been unchanged since 1993, and it is equal
to 0.7448 Euros per hl/degree Plato or 1.87 EUR per hl/degree of alcohol of finished
product. So, in real terms, mt is declining, and this allows us to estimate (4)
in this case. The first column of Table 8 reports the estimation of equation (4)
for beer, using a contiguity weight matrix and IV method. We notice that the
coefficient φ of WTAX is negative as expected but insignificant. The coefficient θ of
the minimum tax rate is negative and insignificant as well. However, the coefficient
γ of the interactive variable, obtained by multiplying the minimum tax time the
spatial lagged dependent variable, is positive and significant.
For Ethyl alcohol, the Article 3(1) of Council Directive 92/84/EEC explains that
the basic minimum rate is fixed at 500 EUR per hl of pure alcohol. However, it also
notes that those Member States which at the time the Directive was adopted already
had rates of duty greater than 1000 ECU per hl were not permitted to reduce their
rates below 1000 ECU. Similarly, Member States with rates between 550 ECU and
1000 ECU were not permitted to make any reduction to their rates. In Table 8,
second column, we show the estimate of equation (4) for ethyl alcohol. The results
are more consistent with the theory. We find a negative although insignificant
value of φ, and the coefficient of the minimum tax, θ, is positive and significant.
The coefficient of the interactive variable, γ, is not zero as expected: positive and
significant.
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5.2 Dependent Variable in National Currency
The regressions we reported were all performed using the dependent variables in
euro, adjusted for inflation. We tried the same regressions using the tax variables in
real national currency. The results are broadly similar and in Table 9 we show the
estimates using a distance weighting matrix. In particular, we notice (i) in every
case, the φ coefficient is higher after 1993 than before (and always positive and
significant); (ii) in every case, we can reject the null of no structural break after
1993. In this case, the reaction function coefficients are somewhat higher than in
the case where the taxes are measured in Euros.
6 Conclusion
In this work we analyzed the effects of the tax competition after the introduction of
the Single Market in EU in 1993. We built a panel data set using 12 EU countries
over a period of 17 years from 1987 to 2004. We tested for the presence of strategic
interaction among neighboring countries using spatial econometrics framework. Our
work differs most other empirical studies in the same area, since we use as dependent
variable the statutory tax rate and not some derived tax ratio. We consider the
excise duty on several goods, as provided by the Excise Duty Tables issued by the
EU Commission.
Our main finding is a structural break after 1993, indicating that the introduction
of the Single Market has modified tax setting among the EU countries. Specifically,
for all five taxes and different weighting matrices we reject the null hypothesis of
equality of coefficients. Moreover, the coefficient measuring strategic interaction is
always significantly positive post-1993, whereas before 1993, sometimes it is not;
and whenever both are significant, the post-1993 coefficient is higher.
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Figure 1: Wine still - Specific Excise in National Currency
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Figure 2: Wine sparkling - Specific Excise in National Currency
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Figure 3: Beer - Specific Excise in National Currency
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Figure 4: Ethyl alcohol - Specific Excise in National Currency
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Figure 5: Cigarettes - Specific Excise in National Currency
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Figure 6: Cigarettes - Total Tax-% retail price
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Table 2: Pooled model with spatially lagged dependent variable and time period fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Wine still specific tax rates - (2000 prices) Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Coefficient Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Wcont Wdis1 Wdis2 Wrand
87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04
WTAX -0.550 0.428∗ 1.088 1.705∗∗∗ 1.784∗ 1.935∗∗∗ -0.099 -0.176
(1.131) (0.156) (1.088) (0.537) (1.040) (0.665) (0.224) (0.137)
total population 0.672 0.437∗ 0.847∗ -0.532∗ 0.882∗ -0.611 0.772 0.795∗
(0.597) (0.255) (0.462) (0.314) (0.466) (0.423) (0.513) (0.408)
gdppca -0.044 0.005 -0.290 -0.028 -0.413 -0.042∗ -0.102 0.045∗∗
(0.248) (0.015) (0.267) (0.021) (0.285) (0.025) (0.155) (0.018)
govconsb 0.502 -0.454 -0.922 1.122 -2.250 1.197 1.075 -2.505
(2.501) (1.166) (2.398) (1.677) (2.788) (2.024) (2.521) (1.581)
govright 5.653 -0.961 6.247 -1.778 6.737 -1.438 6.198 -4.204
(5.945) (2.992) (5.783) (3.432) (6.458) (3.481) (5.239) (2.793)
govleft 6.822 -1.926 10.162 -0.848 11.842 -0.733 7.398 -4.414
(7.127) (4.537) (8.042) (5.227) (8.509) (5.354) (6.297) (4.591)
Intercept 149.506 -365.351∗ -386.615 380.532∗∗ 831.052 436.829 -81.251 -1.168
(484.233) (208.341) (279.784) (162.335) (530.112) (319.065) (68.407) (36.593)
N 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144
R2 0.966 0.981 0.978 0.974 0.974 0.972 0.978 0.979
F-test 62.83 536.39 112.09 637.53 89.09 561.08 133.48 554.73
Pagan-H 7.603 73.245 25.025 73.711 19.901 70.815 32.130 65.549
(0.990) (0.000) (0.200) (0.000) (0.400) (0.000) (0.0568) (0.000)
FIV 1.12 3.52 1.47 10.30 1.23 6.29 7.79 11.84
(0.3511) (0.017) (0.229) (0.000) (0.312) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 3.875 22.721 11.199 53.329 7.801 27.158 51.91 86.72
(0.275) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.050) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 0.046 0.280 7.089 1.640 7.801 0.179 7.261 7.938
(0.9880) (0.869) (0.069) (0.650) (0.124) (0.914) (0.122) (0.093)
Chow Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% std. err. in brackets, p-values for the tests.
F-test: F(17,42) for 87-92 and F(17,126) for 93-04.
a
GDP per capita (constant LCU)
b
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
21
Table 3: Pooled model with spatially lagged dependent variable and time period fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Wine sparkling specific tax rates - (2000 prices) Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Coefficient Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Wcont Wdis1 Wdis2 Wrand
87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04
WTAX -0.763 1.208∗∗∗ 1.248 1.565∗∗∗ -0.349 1.452∗∗∗ 0.053 -0.019
(2.513) (0.339) (0.823) (0.437) (1.625) (0.337) (1.491) (0.169)
total population 1.831 -0.012 2.714∗∗ -0.637 1.965 -0.428 1.235 0.916
(1.392) (0.234) (1.007) (0.574) (1.368) (0.382) (1.404) (0.533)
gdppca -0.086 -0.061 -0.859 -0.061∗∗ -0.307 -0.063∗∗ -0.631 0.058∗∗
(1.043) (0.049) (0.571) (0.026) (0.737) (0.029) (0.391) (0.027)
govconsb -0.479 4.325 -4.090 0.992 0.850 -0.098 -0.736 -4.892
(5.748) (3.143) (5.439) (2.276) (5.412) (2.397) (4.747) (2.496)
govright 12.373 5.309 15.586 -3.312 14.205 -3.505 14.747 -6.597
(10.725) (6.791) (13.534) (4.973) (10.637) (4.839) (9.449) (4.615)
govleft 10.386 2.353 19.741 -3.056 11.780 -3.893 13.684 -6.244
(14.515) (7.103) (17.083) (6.849) (15.305) (6.684) (16.206) (11.379)
Intercept 362.944 1.377 -1358.000∗∗ 400.457 730.387 413.905 -177.544 9.884
(1774.486) (89.921) (579.341) (289.677) (1252.846) (307.862) (122.735) (50.763)
N 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144
R2 0.955 0.972 0.968 0.985 0.973 0.985 0.974 0.984
F-test 68.85 843.78 136.10 1247.68 158.33 1279.50 183.44 927.93
Pagan-H 6.233 39.733 17.926 52.699 26.354 49.833 24.536 58.582
(0.997) (0.003) (0.592) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (0.267) (0.000)
FIV 0.32 4.75 1.41 7.53 2.42 24.86 9.99 13.06
( 0.814) (0.003) (0.249) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.577) (0.000)
Anderson 1.642 14.402 12.14 43.942 9.039 58.185 50.35 66.77
(0.649) (0.002) (0.016) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 0.108 0.284 7.788 1.727 2.994 1.405 7.459 10.115
(0.947) 0.867) (0.050) (0.630) (0.083) (0.235) (0.113) (0.038)
Chow Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% std. err. in brackets, p-values for the tests.
F-test: F(17,42) for 87-92 and F(17,126) for 93-04.
a
GDP per capita (constant LCU)
b
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
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Table 4: Pooled model with spatially lagged dependent variable and time period fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Beer specific tax rates (2000 prices) Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Coefficient Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Wcont Wdis1 Wdis2 Wrand
87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04
WTAX 0.265 0.309∗ 1.610∗∗∗ 1.685∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗ -0.062
(0.384) (0.175) (0.554) (0.467) (0.524) (0.391) (0.302) (0.119)
total population 0.015 0.020∗∗ -0.014 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.028∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
gdppca 0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.001∗ -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
govconsb 0.080∗ 0.036 -0.042 0.142∗∗ -0.047 0.110∗∗ -0.038 -0.008
(0.042) (0.037) (0.077) (0.055) (0.087) (0.047) (0.079) (0.038)
govright 0.039 0.046 0.040 0.085 0.053 0.058 0.015 -0.024
(0.051) (0.095) (0.137) (0.107) (0.110) (0.101) (0.070) (0.079)
govleft 0.072 0.016 0.081 0.105 0.082 0.045 0.116 -0.035
(0.117) (0.144) (0.174) (0.162) (0.155) (0.156) (0.128) (0.138)
Intercept -4.228 1.861 0.465 4.168 15.465 -1.004 -1.678 -1.315
(6.421) (2.025) (2.052) (5.771) (9.293) (1.963) (1.821) (1.007)
N 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144
R2 0.987 0.985 0.983 0.964 0.984 0.967 0.981 0.987
F-test 213.45 281.51 244.70 219.27 179.60 214.74 153.32 483.48
Pagan-H 17.735 66.717 28.265 2.123 27.124 73.006 27.947 67.039
(0.604) (0.000) (0.132) (0.000) (0.166) (0.000) 0.1417 (0.000)
FIV 1.35 3.94 11.30 11.74 13.41 13.88 11.60 11.52
(0.270) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 5.508 27.154 45.378 69.692 45.571 69.848 49.582 83.204
(0.239) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 4.779 7.768 5.574 7.193 2.683 9.320 6.618 4.794
(0.188) (0.051) (0.233) (0.126) (0.612) (0.053) (0.157) (0.3091)
Chow Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% std. err. in brackets, p-values for the tests.
F-test: F(17,42) for 87-92 and F(17,126) for 93-04.
a
GDP per capita (constant LCU)
b
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
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Table 5: Pooled model with spatially lagged dependent variable and time period fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Ethyl Alcohol specific tax rates (2000 prices) Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Coefficient Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Wcont Wdis1 Wdis2 Wrand
87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04
WTAX 0.357 0.678∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 1.260 1.171∗∗∗ 468.042∗∗∗ 25.795
(0.313) (0.366) (0.470) (0.270) (0.752) (0.281) (170.743) (72.316)
total population 20.349∗∗ 1.421 -2.550 -9.311∗∗ 1.678 -8.593∗ 12.153 8.560∗
(9.269) (6.952) (5.814) (4.035) (10.735) (4.705) (8.208) (4.538)
gdppca -3.655 2.304∗∗∗ -2.981 1.024 -2.742 0.799 -4.116 2.190∗
(5.341) (0.568) (4.754) (1.222) (4.828) (1.201) (5.627) (1.304)
govconsb 48.082 10.101 -8.804 21.846 -1.872 12.921 -10.665 29.982
(30.938) (37.158) (31.958) (21.983) (44.541) (24.591) (36.827) (26.137)
govright 22.697 -20.973 86.778 -78.569 83.953 -77.961 21.921 -83.333
(49.042) (82.089) (86.248) (75.338) (80.581) (74.522) (55.786) (69.742)
govleft 152.522 -182.880∗ 200.393∗ -180.119∗ 196.353∗ -178.296∗ 126.596 -227.056∗∗
(105.022) (99.795) (116.895) (101.844) (116.29) (99.766) (108.519) (113.950)
Intercept 6296.901 -3627.501∗∗ 1239.071 7147.908∗∗ 5479.077 -1326.798∗∗ -1818.842∗∗ 121.114
(10365.494) (1443.639) (852.079) (3251.876) (9759.017) (668.68) (787.610) (508.953)
N 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144
R2 0.922 0.897 0.933 0.905 0.939 0.908 0.917 0.904
F-test 127.56 163.84 129.67 88.49 172.80 87.45 70.65 174.53
Pagan-H 36.086 78.192 18.580 47.865 15.531 43.211 28.247 66.821
(0.010) (0.000) (0.549) (0.000) (0.688) (0.001) (0.1333) (0.000)
FIV 13.10 14.70 9.10 35.00 3.01 33.44 11.60 11.52
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 31.196 43.810 36.991 95.697 14.073 79.809 49.582 83.204
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 5.220 0.422 8.491 1.621 6.741 1.517 10.683 6.921
(0.073) (0.809) (0.036) (0.654) (0.034) (0.468) (0.0304) (0.140)
Chow Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% std. err. in brackets, p-values for the tests.
F-test: F(17,42) for 87-92 and F(17,126) for 93-04.
a
GDP per capita (constant LCU)
b
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
24
Table 6: Pooled model with spatially lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Cigarettes specific tax rates (2000 prices) - Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Coefficient Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Wcont Wdis1 Wdis2 Wrand
87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04
WTAX 0.500∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 1.946∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗ 1.718∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.287) (0.312) (0.353) (0.308) (0.288) (0.184) (0.102)
total population 0.559∗∗∗ -0.273 0.365∗∗ -1.353∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ -0.852∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.364
(0.126) (0.327) (0.150) (0.383) (0.138) (0.321) (0.144) (0.354)
gdppca -0.036 -0.079∗∗ -0.032 -0.074∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.082∗∗∗ -0.016 0.017
(0.033) (0.039) (0.028) (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.039) (0.016)
govconsb 0.723∗ 3.382∗∗ 0.250 -0.667 0.279 -1.832 0.018 -1.369
(0.428) (1.597) (0.525) (1.300) (0.609) (1.284) (0.745) (1.505)
govright -0.071 3.909 -0.444 -0.511 -0.430 -2.305 -0.691 -3.870
(0.810) (3.478) (0.954) (2.648) (0.875) (2.661) (0.844) (2.856)
govleft 1.352 5.250 0.776 3.121 0.871 0.599 0.971 -3.384
(1.238) (4.356) (1.341) (4.349) (1.285) (4.234) (1.341) (4.163)
Intercept 72.936 119.609 13.676 1145.768∗∗∗ 78.598 78.165∗∗∗ 30.238 -24.635
(61.855) (81.460) (10.916) (313.818) (72.961) (21.221) (0.0873) (44.816)
N 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144
R2 0.988 0.902 0.987 0.904 0.986 0.911 0.983 0.926
F-test 303.25 86.72 1053.50 288.79 487.81 174.76 360.78 238.70
Pagan-H 21.060 55.911 30.077 74.39 23.243 73.408 29.021 67.369
(0.393) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (0.331) (0.000) (0.113) (0.000)
FIV 36.307 2.69 59.16 13.59 20.06 18.15 48.64 7.70
(0.000) (0.0341) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 8.11 20.59 85.068 68.590 68.584 96.354 92.641 99.296
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 0.51 5.07 1.26 3.46 4.32 5.14 6.437 16.485
(0.916) (0.166) (0.738) (0.325) (0.363) (0.272) (0.168) (0.002)
Chow Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% std. err. in brackets, p-values for the tests.
F-test: F(17,42) for 87-92 and F(17,126) for 93-04.
a
GDP per capita (constant LCU)
b
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
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Table 7: Pooled model with spatially lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Cigarettes total tax rates (2000 prices) - Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Coefficient Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Wcont Wdis1 Wdis2 Wrand
87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04
WTAX 1.166∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 1.726∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.022
(0.296) (0.153) (0.184) (0.211) (0.196) (0.188) (0.192) (0.044)
total population 0.179 0.175∗∗∗ 0.111 -0.060 0.036 -0.011 -0.033 0.118∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.065) (0.148) (0.096) (0.149) (0.067) (0.114) (0.042)
gdppca -0.041 -0.018∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.035∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.013∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.006) (0.051) (0.006) (0.055) (0.005) (0.052) (0.004)
govconsb 0.289 0.095 1.608∗ 1.438∗∗∗ 1.174 0.951∗ 1.139 -0.465∗
(0.878) (0.444) (0.858) (1.300) (0.725) (0.494) (0.853) (0.263)
govright 0.240 1.061 0.472 1.113∗ 0.604 1.015∗ -0.691 0.189
(0.810) (0.685) (0.770) (0.600) (0.755) (0.556) (0.844) (0.413)
govleft 0.489 1.209 1.293 0.776 1.374 .365 0.419 0.281
(1.259) (1.000) (1.212) (1.013) (1.162) (0.965) (1.098) (0.587)
Intercept 68.149 -6.674 -58.814∗∗∗ -9.641 -43.974 31.383∗ 57.854∗∗∗ 80.086∗∗∗
(131.032) (15.783) (18.490) (67.962) (118.850) (16.859) (0.0873) (7.170)
N 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144
R2 0.819 0.902 0.956 0.758 0.961 0.773 0.856 0.874
F-test 123.87 47.04 85.72 36.89 98.54 40.73 65.52 92.05
Pagan-H 15.647 27.378 16.493 18.181 19.118 21.080 37.679 30.831
(0.680) (0.096) (0.685) (0.575) (0.514) (0.392) (0.014) (0.076)
FIV 2.60 12.3 32.97 5.82 29.41 7.35 110.13 41.65
(0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 18.29 57.362 111.70 27.333 107.54 30.870 139.85 146.87
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 5.79 0.29 7.56 0.35 7.14 1.43 5.976 8.076
(0.055) (0.863) (0.056) ( 0.950) (0.067) (0.697) (0.200) (0.088)
Chow Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% std. err. in brackets, p-values for the tests.
F-test: F(17,42) for 87-92 and F(17,126) for 93-04.
a
GDP per capita (constant LCU)
b
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
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Table 8: Estimation with Minimum Tax Rate
Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Dependent variable: excise duty in 2000 prices
Control Variables Beer Alcohol
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
WTAX -0.327 -0.374
(0.262) (0.462)
mintax × WTAX 0.479∗∗ 0.220∗
(0.196) (0.117)
mintax -0.037 0.423∗∗
(0.218) (0.189)
total population 0.023∗∗∗ 6.934∗
(0.007) (3.664)
gdppc -0.002∗∗ 2.321∗∗
(0.001) (1.056)
govcons 0.040 14.165
(0.032) (17.724)
govright -0.048 34.173
(0.085) (57.777)
govleft -0.059 -83.202
(0.126) (91.058)
N 204 204
R2 0.959 0.887
F(19,184) 314.036 142.671
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 9: Pooled model with spatially lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects
Dependent Variable: specific tax rates national currency (2000 prices) - Spatial Autoregressive Model - IV
Coefficient Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Wine still Wine spark Beer Ethyl Alcohol Cigarettes
87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04 87-92 93-04
WTAX 0.227 1.275∗∗ 0.121 1.447∗∗ 0.903 1.212∗∗∗ 0.650∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 0.075 2.041∗∗
(0.409) (0.598) (0.386) (0.707) (0.586) (0.366) (0.354) (0.334) (0.347) (0.884)
total population 4.548 -2.470 13.392 -7.967 -0.009 -0.731 477.927 -836.261 3.689 -80.745∗
(2.792) (1.612) (8.606) (5.475) (2.344) (1.011) (1151.235) (690.570) (4.048) (43.748)
gdppca -2.470∗ 0.096 -7.658 0.062 -0.696 -0.289∗∗ -113.840 -253.119∗∗∗ 3.391 -4.730∗
(1.392) (0.104) (4.666) (0.236) (1.205) (0.111) (631.182) (82.857) (2.960) (2.570)
govconsb -11.011 18.149∗ -41.248 61.800∗ 29.906 4.434 17936.178 4122.954 90.143∗ 384.659∗∗
(9.694) (9.951) (31.846) (33.405) (18.976) (6.937) (10716.275) (4651.274) (45.497) (160.289)
govright 74.206∗ 11.665 205.992∗ 42.960 28.991 7.414 21635.954 5219.824 -8.364 279.130
(39.522) (16.463) (110.339) (53.270) (66.952) (23.066) (50870.817) (15562.001) (107.219) (237.860)
govleft 62.231 -5.688 135.237 -5.817 51.715 1.233 39745.669 -339.858 79.216 468.366
(40.015) (16.375) (93.635) (52.212) (67.093) (21.824) (44678.678) (15108.077) (103.094) (298.273)
Intercept -1938.394 1375.428 -5319.229 4994.327 266.371 -350.972∗ -757617.485 584716.611 -8773.199 58896.784∗
(1464.029) (1105.371) (4393.763) (3874.648) (2378.671) (183.514) (765175.427) (575301.389) (6681.727) (34715.104)
N 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144 60 144
R2 0.973 0.979 0.972 0.979 0.958 0.995 0.782 0.987 21.324 0.804
F-test 154.01 256.43 119.77 193.26 18.55 479.10 7.58 299.98 21.32 25.01
Pagan-H 33.428 92.275 43.574 89.037 35.700 58.616 39.924 60.495 24.483 47.574
(0.041) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.221) (0.000)
FIV 3.51 10.65 3.48 8.48 4.65 9.82 4.14 9.22 4.64 6.92
(0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Anderson 22.784 52.142 22.638 42.973 23.380 39.905 26.093 46.141 23.360 29.216
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 6.515 5.689 7.340 3.765 3.054 7.753 4.540 9.029 4.093 6.905
(0.163) (0.223) (0.119) (0.438) (0.383) (0.051) (0.337) (0.060) (0.251) (0.075)
Chow Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho Rej Ho
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% std. err. in brackets, p-values for the tests.
F-test: F(17,42) for 87-92 and F(17,126) for 93-04. Distance weighting matrix used.
a
GDP per capita (constant LCU)
b
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
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